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'164 STERLING REALTY CO. v. RELFE [21 C;2d 
.;. '~, [B~ F. No~ 16432. In Bank. Nov. 2, ,1942.] 
SrrERLING REALTY COMPANY (a Corporation), Appel-
. 'lant, v.EMILY RELFE et ~., Respondents. . 
[la, 1b] Streetll-'-~provement Under Charters-Sal~Certifi.cate 
. of Sale ....... Undera street .hriprovemeilt ordinance directing a 
sale mcase of default in the payment of any installment due 
under the bond for the asiiessment,and the issuance' "for each 
sale" of' a ¢erlifi¢ate,of sale describing. the dparcels" . sold and 
th~'delivery of the "oi-iginals" to the purchaser, a single cer" 
tifi9ll:teciover;ing 'an owner's separate parcels of land sepa-
rately assessed and . separately sold is voi~ as the landowner'l;! 
· rjght of red,eli;tptionis substantially in~ringed; and subsequent 
proceedings are aririuUed. The word "parcels~' in the ordir,iance 
· ;referS to tlJ,e Parcels upon which a single as~essment is levied. 
[2] T~ti~n'"'":'S~~CoIilpliance 'with Statute.--InaSmuch as tax 
· i>f60eedin~' ar~ in .n~itum, the statute must be strictly followed, 
otll:~rw,'iset4ey' ~~. void. . 
IS] 'Street"";'Improvemeilt .Under Charters-Salll-'-Certifi.cate of 
"i ·Sale.+A. singlecert4i,cllte of sale issued following sales-under 
.bonlls fQrstre~timpJ:ovements- is not equive.lent ,to separate 
. cert~cate:s where,alt)lOugh there is adescripti6:n'of each lot 
.' ,8.n~qpp~~ite.t~ereto· a statemeiit o~ the SWn due' under ·the 
bond and 'assessmeut, there is no statement that these are the 
. 'sU#(~o~,;i~~~h,e~c,h lot\yas sold. "., . 
[4] Id...-:':"Improvement Under Charters-Sale-Certi1l.cate of Sale 
. ' . ....:..:Btf~ ofDefects.~Although a street ¥nprovement orill-
I; .~~~I~El~ts,)t~a.ta ~ale ,on4efau~t under a bong for asses,s~ 
men~ sliaU be made hke.anexecutlOnsale, ,the 1'),11e as to the 
. . effeot ofdefeots in a' certificate of exe6utionsaIe is notappii-
,,'\:)',~~I'1)1~j;ffltf.~~~-~M'ticularIy covered by the ordinance.' . 
~6r Id.'-Ac1!ions::-Qui~ting Title-Judgment.~Anowner 'ofsev-
'.' " erSJ proPerties~ subject to the lien ~f a street assesslIl-ent "aJ;i-
" . not have his title unconditionally quieted against the lien while 
i 'thejasse~sn:ient arid.the obligation of the bonds are alive. But 
,although he does n~t plead a tender of the amoUnt due on all. 
i' Qr--anyof the parcels or make one, yet' where the single cer-
tificate of Ilal.e on the several sales is void, the. plairitllI is en .. 
[2] See. 24 'Cal.Jut. 324; 26 It..C.L. 394. 
[4J See 11 Cal.Jur.133j 21 Am;Jur. 141. 
[5] See 17 QatJur. 1005. 
Melt. 'Dig~ References: [1, 3, 4] Streets, § 546; [2] Taxation,' 
§ 301; [5] Streets, § 598; [6] Quieting Title, § 39. 
Nov. 1942J STERLING REALTY Co. v. RELFE 
[21 O.2d 164J 
165 
titled to a decree determining his rights and quieting his title 
as to a~y or all parcels on condition that he pay' the amount 
due aga.mst each, together with the penalties and costs of sale. 
[6] Q~ietin~ ~itle-D.efenses-Laches.-A landowner suing to 
qU1et h1s title agamst the sale under a bond for a street as-
se~sment is not ~il~y of laches where his action is commenced 
p.rlOr to the e~1r~tlOn of the redemption period from the cer..; 
tlficate of sale if It were valid. 
. APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior 'Court of the 
CIty and County of· San Francisco. Franklin, A .. Griffin, Judge 
Reversed with directions. . 
Action t~ quiet title. JUdgment for defendants. reversed 
with directions. , 
Phil F. Garvey and Julia M. Easley for Appellant. 
. , . 
J ohnJ.O 'Toole, 9ity AttorIley (Sa~ Francisco). N ox:man 
S. Wol1l,' Deputy,clty Attor:ney, Ralph .A1fredWood, ,Jr.; 
and Henry F. Wrigley for. Respondents. " ." i " ' ' .. 
. C.A.RT~R, J.~~laint!ff ~Pp(l~ls fr9m, ajlld~eIlt denyi~g 
It>r,~lief In an~ ~ctIO:n . to; ,q}:lIet t~tle to seventt·:6:~epa:rce1s of 
r.eal property sItuated In the CIty and county o£. . san: Fran-
CISCO. '. . ' . 
". Tlte,. recor(idiscloses. that in' 1926, plaintiff was the owner . 
or, !3eY,?~ty~eight separate parcels of real property sithated lil.· 
sU1d:lty and ,county: It is not questioned, that 'in that year, 
Pllr~Uf,l~t:to .a .str,eet Itnprovement ~rdiriance of sajd city and 
,co~tY, prOVIdIng therefor,. proceedings ,were reglllarlytaken 
for the constrllc~ion of aJlimpr6velnen~ affecting s~idpropefty, 
the leVY,of-anass~!ilment thereon and the. iSsuance of bb:ridsfor 
the,I,1ay¢,ent of .. ~llch !,:~eSsnlent. One~Qnd Was iSSued against 
each of theseveIlty~eIg~tparcels.of said. property, Defendant 
Fed~ral ConstrUGt~on CompaIlY ,bec~i:rle the owner of said 
bon~.~ach ~ bon~ex.ecute~hy pla~tut,'wa~ payahle'bothas 
to prInclplll andll.lterest 'In twenty $e~i-anilulil inStallments 
re~J;'~senti~g the' amoUllt of the, asse~enfon . each parcel' of 
saId ~rop.erty, ~leven. of the fustallinen~ paYments were' made' 
by plallltifftblit it de,faulted on theinStalhhent- which became 
. dlleFebrnary 4, 1933, and it has. since been in default. . On 
MaJ;'cl:t 5" !~37, in accordance with the ordinance , and. at the 
request of the Federal Construction Compa.ny, the property 
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,,". ' 
WIl.$Soldbythe officia),sOl the city and county of San Fran-
cisco beCaWle.of .thatdefault. It is not questioned that the 
sale was regular in: all respects except as hereinafter men-. 
'tio:p,ed. The purcha.serat the'. sale . was defendant Emily Relfe. 
One :certmcate Qf'sale was issued to her for all of the seventy-
eightpa.rgelSof 'proPerty. the ordinance authorized the sale 
of'the prope;t':ty upon '4~fault as specified in the bonds, the 
approved fOfuJ,of whic,hread: 
''In the eVent ofdefat;tltin the payment of any installment 
••. the,lloard .. ,.~ is hereby authorized to sell the property 
herein desorib..ed to pay the amount so due, together with the 
expenses of such sale. . 
"Such &aieshallbe made in the manner and form provided 
by law for the .sale of real property upon execution. . . ." 
(Emphasis added;) The bond also gave the holder thereof the 
following remedy: 
" ..• the person in legal ownership of this bond, shall, in 
the event of such default, have the right to foreclose the lien 
created by the said assessment for any unpaid portion thereof, 
as in the case where no bond had been made or executed, and 
such lien shall continue until such assessment is fully paid." 
With reference to the sale and certificate of sale, the require-
ments. are; 
_ "The said ~oard ishel,'eby autlJ.orize<.l to make any sale au-
. thoriz~d,by __ any ag,!eementaild bond and shall issue for each 
s~le anOF~~W.~ ~nd41lI?licate ~ertificate of s~l~, in apptop~iate 
tQ~lll! . ~ef~~r.UJ.g to thls Ordinance, desc,Ir1blng the parcels 
sold and contliinmg the name of the purchaser; the originals 
shall.be ,d~li~e:J;ea to the purchaser and the duplicates shall be 
on flle:,iIl the form of stubs' in Ii certificate book." (Emphasis 
added.).A:deedto'the property described in the certificate 
'J:stobe issued,to the purchaser one year after the sale if the 
property is not redeemed. A year's period of redemption is 
allowed the 'owner' an<.l "all redemption money shall be paid 
by' the Boar<.l of Public WOl,'ks to the holder' of the proper 
orighl-~l ~er.ti1,ica.te ,of sale, upon delivering up the same and 
receipt~ngfor the, amount received." 
,-Iti$ pia4Itiff'l'\'~~~ that the certificate of sale and sale of 
the lots .was -voidbeca.use only one certificate of sale was issued 
for a,U of the. aeyenty-eight lots, rather than a s~parate certifi-
~tefor;eac41ot;th,at by making the certificate m that fashion 
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plaintiff was inj~red by. having thereby impaired its right to 
redee~ the lots separately. 
[la] Clearly the ordinance contemplated that each parcel 
of plaintiff's property be sold ·separately. That is true becaUse 
each lot was ~ndividuany assessed and .each bond was a lien 
against the particular parcel described therein .. It is the gen-
eral rule that several parcels of real property separately as-
sessed should be sold separately at a tax saie even though 
having a common owner. (Stege v. Oity of Richmond, 194 Cal. 
30S [228 P. 461] ; 61 C.J. 1197.) Only one certificate of sale 
was issued in the instant case for all of the lots and it might 
be construed to mean that a separate sale of each of the par-
cels was not had inasmuch as it refers to a "sale" (singular) 
and recites that "but one bid was received" and which was 
"$46,094.04 for all of said 78 lots. " However, the testimony is 
uncontradicted and the court found that the lots were sold 
individually. So far as appears it must therefore be concluded 
that the sale itself was valid. 
Nevertheless if the certificate of sale was invalid, all pro-
ceedings thereafter taken would be invalid including the ulti-
mate deed of the property to the purchaser after the expira-
tion of the period of redemption. The ordinance provides that 
"At any time before the expiration of one year from the 
date of the certificate of sale" the property ma.y be redeemed. 
If the certificate of sale is invalid then the period within which 
the property could be redeemed would not· have commenced 
to run. It was said in Hinds v; Olark, 173 Cal. 49, 52 [159 P. 
153], involving a tax sale to the City, a void certificate issued 
by the city treasurer to the city and a subsequent deed to the 
cityfollo'Wedby a deed from the city to a private purchaser, 
in which the owner brought an action to quiet title: 
"But. we do not "find· it necessary to consider whether the 
latt.er discrepancy is error, or if so, whether it is fatal to the 
defendant's alleged title to the land, as we are satisfied that 
the failure to correctly state in the certificate the time 'when 
the city will be entitled to a deed' renders the certificate void, 
and annuls' the subsequent proceedings." (Emphasis added.) 
It is to be noted that under the ordinance here in question 
a certificate of sale is to be issued "for each sale. " We think 
it is clear that a separate sale of each parcel 'Was necessary, 
hence there should have been a separate certificate of sale for 
each parcel. True, the ordinance goes on to provide that the 
" 
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certificate shall describe the "parcels" (plural) sold, but that 
ref~rs to. parcels upon which a single assessment was levied, 
wasmuch 'as inim:ediately following that clause it is said the 
~j'originaIs" shall be delivered .to the purchaser. The words 
~"for' each sale' ~'. are, :specific and contrql overfl.ny. inference 
iliat may 'flow' from general language. [2] Inasmuch as tax 
p~oceeduigs are'ininvitum, the statute must besti-ictly fol-
lowed,' otherwise they are void. (24 .Cal.Jur .. 324.), 'l'his does 
~ot me~,~t"w~~~'t~ere, are separate sal,~s' and a~l pro-
ceedingsl~adil1g,up'ito,~d including the sales are valld, the 
pur~ase~.,inai~o~ ;b~~:&ititied to have a corr,ected cl:lrtificate 
~ued, ,to~im:u;n4er Jl.!.e~a~e rule that entitles 8: purchaser 
'at a tax 'saiEdo 'h~ve" a corrected deed issued to him where 
aU'of,th~ 'p~oe~~dm:~ are regular. (See Webster v. Somer, 159 
C84,', 4.5,9nl{.f.:,~:~?5J ;Foz v. Townsend, 152 Cal. 51 [91 P. 
'~004,'1007lj-,,R~'u,th:y.i9uinn, 20 Ca1.2d 488 [127 P.2d 1].) 
: r31:Detend~.n1!:lContend~however, that the single certificate 
was substantially equivalent to separate ~ertificates. Ins: 't:ru,e 
that'the certincate in question does set forth a descrip~ion of 
,e.~c1;lJotb.B-t, ,~pp()~~~ethereto'appears the sum due under the 
b,ond an:dassessmEllit. It does not state that thOE~e are the sums for 
'whlcheach,parc,el was .sold,although the total amount recited 
~$, havilig'~~e~ "bid, for the lots equals the total of thOse' s~. 
It is obvious, therefore, that the single certificate covering all 
}?r,we)A~i:iV~,P~F;' t.Jle' equivalent o:fa separate ,certificate of 
~aJ,~itf<?,~, 1~~clh!B~';"~' ,:, 
<., [.]: Ae~~q~ts :re!er to the rules pertaining to execution 
lI.Ia!,El#" s;g,~[!~':1~a1; ,~?;tain defects in a certificate of sale do 
~pt ;t#fec,t,~~v;~~~ty\ o~ t4e st¥e (Anthony v. J anssen~ 183 Cal. 
, 329. [191 'P~ ,538] ) ,an:d that. various instances of irregularity 
t . '. "'I·'j,.· '. ". '.' .' , ...... . 
in. such' ~ ,~e, do.\not . ren4er it subject to attack. (11 Cal.J ur. 
1133 ).Th~y all(lo 'PQint to the statement in the ordinance that 
.the sales when ,the· bond is not paid "shall be made in the 
~axiner. an:q.formp~ovided by law for the sale of real' prop-
erty, upon .execution." The sales under the ordinance are 
taX sales and. a strict compliance with the law is required in 
sales:i;>f that character: It is said in Walton v. Moore, 58 Ore. 
237 [113 P.58,5~, 114 P. 105]: 
"While the proceedings regarding the sale of land for taxes 
is ,in manyr~pects analogous to sales of real property on 
execution, yet there is abundant reason for requiring a stricter 
compliance' with statutory requirements in the former than 
in the latter class of cases. Sales on execution are usually the 
result of the voluntary contracts or acts of the debtor. There is 
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an opportunity to realize something approaching the full val ue 
of the property sold and only soinuch nee4 be sold as will 
satisfy the !iebt. While in tax sales t4~ liability is involuntary 
and the delinq-uency usually the result or poverty or accident,' 
and. however great the value of the property, it cannot· be 
sold for more thaIi.the amount of the tax. "The reference 
in the ordinancie to the' 'manner and fo~m" of execution saleS 
c~n~ot be sa:id.. to reqw,re th~ application of the rules pertain-
ing to execution sales to :qlatters particularly covered by the 
taxordinanc.e,: which we have seen is the case in the instant 
acti()D..COi:l:trary·t9 the rules applied to exe.cution sales it 
hal(l been held that various defects in a certificate in a tax' 
sale wiIl;riullify the proceedings.' (See Hinds v. alark~ supra; 
Pre~t()nv.1Iir$oh, 5 Cal.App. 485 [90 P. 965].) 
[lbJ W-ethink.it is obvious that the hiyalidity of the cer,-
tificate of sa1c' affected the substantial riihts. of the plaintiff.' 
It.appears from the above. qUQteq portion of the ordinance 
th~~ the pwp:er may redeem the property wIthin one year 
after the. sale upon paying the amount for which· the property 
'\Vas sold pluS a. penalty,and <tall redenipt.ion money shall 
be paid by the130ard ... to the holder of the ... cei-tificate 
·of salt~,upondeli'/)eringup the same. and receipting for' the 
amoUnt received." With only one certificate of sale for all of' 
the parcels,itif! obvious that co~pliance could not be had with, 
that provision of the ordinance, if the owner desired to re-
deem. any number of the parcels less than all of them. The 
purchaser would not wish to deliver the certificate of sale 
because he. would still pe. entitled to it as representing his 
rights in the parcels not redeemed, while' the owner' would 
lie entitled to l1ave the certificate no longer o1).tstanding and 
thus a cloud on his title as to the parcels redeemed. The own-
eJ,"s right to redeem should not be made dependent upon what 
the city officials might endeavor to accomplish as a solution of 
the dilemma, when no solution could be in conformity with 
the terms of the ordinance. Defendants' contention that be-
cause there has been a redemption by the owner of three of 
the seventy~eight parcels of th,e property the above difficulty is 
shown not to exist, is not convincing inasllluchas the cir-
cumstances of tliose redemptions do not appear, and we are 
advised of no method whereby they c,ould have been made in 
conformity with the ordinance. 
TID. connection with the question of the single certificate of 
• 
170 STERLING REALTY CO. v. RELFE [21 C.2d 
si¥~ supstalltially infringing plaintiff's rights, defendants re-
fer' to, the s~ction. of, the ordinance reading: 
"The provisio~ of this Ordinance shall be liberally con-
~t1'1;ledto promote the objects thereof, and no error, omission, 
or irregularity in connection with the proceedings thereunder 
not aftecting a substantial right of a party interested shall 
iziovalidate any of such proceedings." That section can be of 
no ,help to defendants because as we have seen a substantial 
right of the plaintiff has been affected. 
'. [5] Plaintiff urges that under the ordinance two liens are 
created on the property, .one securing the assessment, and the 
qther securing the obligation represented by the bonds; that 
the former is declared by the ordinance to continue until the 
assessment is paid, whereas the latter is not; that the lien 
secu~ing the obligation of the bonds maybe foreclosed by a 
sale of tlie I>roperty as was had in the case at bar, but that 
the other lien may be foreclosed by an action therefor' that 
because the lien securing the bonds did not continue until the 
obligation was paid, it expired by virtue of section 2911 
of the CiVil Code as, to any installments that had become 
pa~able. mor~ th,anfour years prior to the sale (Code Civ. 
Proc., §337); and that as the eleventh installment became 
dlle morEl: than four years before the sale, the sale was void 
inasmuch' as the purchase price included that installment. 
The obligation created by the bonds is the same as the assess-
ment, the latter being the basis for the former. But whatever 
may ~ the ru~e in that respect plaintiff concedes that the 
obligation and the assessment lien are alive. Its action is one 
to quiet title and it is not entitled to an unconditional decree 
in JtS fayor. The r1;lle in I!.ll analogous situation is applicable. 
Although the obligation is barred by the statute of limitation 
" , 
a I)lortgagor cannot have his title unconditionally quieted 
agaipst the. lien of the mortgagee. (17 Cal.Jur. 1005.) It is, 
conceded by plaintiff that the lien of the assessment is con-
tin:~ing, and that therefore, if the bondholder brought an 
8:ction of foreclosure, the statute of limitation would not be 
a l;>ar.' 
Defendants assert that the judgment is correct because 
plaintiff cJ..i:d not tender or offer to pay the amount admittedly 
due. under t~e bonds and that inasmuch as he is asking for 
eqUItable rehef, he must do equity. It appears that no offer 
'Yas. made br ~laint4I to par the amount due o~ a.U Qf any: 
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one of the parcels of the property. Plaintiff's complaint is in 
the conventional form of quiet title actions which in sub-' 
stance alleges that it is the owner of the property and that 
defendants claim an interest therein but their claim is without 
right. The prayer was for such other and further relief as 
shall seem meet and just in equity. 
Defendants rely upon Stege v. Oity of Richmond, supra; 
and Bradley 00. v. Ridgeway, 14 Cal.App.2d 326 [58 P.2d 
194]. In the Stege case the action was by an owner to quiet 
title against an invalid sale for delinquent special assessments. 
Judgment for defendants was affirmed on appeal even though 
the proceedings were invalid. The court stated at page 318: 
"But the fact that the sale of appellants' property was in-
valid would not necessarily entitle the appellants to a decree 
quieting their title under the circumstances here shown. . . . 
The plaintiffs in this equitable action seek to relieve the lands 
from the burden of the assessment for such benefits without 
paying or offering to pay their just portion of the cost of the 
improvements .... The later case of Hayne v. San Franci$co, 
174 Cal. 185 [162 P. 625], was an action to quiet title. The 
defendant asserted a lien on the land by virtue of certain' 
speci8.! assessments levied to pay the costs of the construction 
of a tunnel. The plaintiffs did not payor offer to pay the 
assessments. The court said: 'As we find the assessment to be 
valid, the property of the plaintiffs is justly liable for its 
due proportion thereof. In such cases the, plaintiff is not en-
titled to any relief in a court of equity unless he shall pay, 
or offer to pay, the amount actually due upon the assessment 
ngainst his property. As was said in Ellis v. Witmer, 134 Cal. 
253 [66 P. 303], "this being the case they cannot successfully 
invoke the assistance of a court of equity against the irreg-
ularities in the sale complained of, unless on the condition of 
paying what is due from them. Here 1W such condition has 
been imposed by the court, nor is there an offer in the com-
plaint to pay what is due. The plaintiffs were therefore not 
entitled to relief." , " (Emphasis added;) 
The intimation is clear from the foregoing that it is wholly 
proper that a conditional judgment may be entered which 
preserves the lien of defendants. Although plaintiff did not 
plead a tender or make one, as we have seen, if the ordinance 
'is ,complied with plaintiff is confronted with a difficult situa~ 
tion 'with reference to the exercise of its right to redeem the 
" 
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v~ious parcel~ severally. It is entitled to a d~term~atiQn ~f 
i~ dghts urider the circUID.!Starices.The certificate ISSued ~s" 
void and it should be so determined. Defendants have thelr' 
lien 'on the property' and it s40uld be protected, but plaintiff ' 
shoUld have its #tle' quJetedas to any or all of the parcels 
upon condition that it pay within the. time allowed for ~edemp­
tioJl" the amount. dUe against such parcel together Wlth pen-
alties and the cost,s of 'the sale. The court should order correct 
c~rtific~tes of I)aleissued and' ~ompute the period of redemp-
ti~n fromt1i~l!date'thereof; That equity requires such a result 
i~;~##i~~,,~~~!~n,{ ~~¥' we cOilsid~r that the. j~~gment: de-
cla:rest1).a,~"th~: :p.epa,rtment of PublIc. Works 18 . authorlzed 
to make, isstteand deliver to. . . Emlly Relfe a deeq to the 
re~lpro~e~~y;" 'ay:~e~on of the invalidity of the certificate' 
ofsalesheisn:ofentitl~d to such deed. If that provision were' 
pe~#itt~d·toreIriaip:.in ~h~ judgment it woul~ be tanta~6u~t 
to'quietingi!tle ~~EW1y ;Relfe against plaintlff and deprlve It 
of'its . right Qfred~lripti6n. 
. [6] Defen.dants assert that plaintiff was guilty of laches.Suf-
fice'itto:s~:fthat"th~'s9Je was held on April 28, 1937, and the 
~erlificaie bea.~s that date. Plajntiff commenced its action on 
April ~O,'.'1938,'prior to the expiration of the period of re~ 
de~ption if the certificate had been valid. 
The judgment is reversed and the trial court is directed 
tQ enter 'a . decree in accordance with the views herein ex-
l):~,:essed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk,J., Curtis, J., Schauer; J. pro tem., 
concurred. ,. , 
" TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent. It was admitted by the parties, 
and the majority opinion concedes, that the proceedings lead-
jng to the sale were valid in all respects. It is also conceded 
that the sale of the property was valid. In this regard the trial 
court found, and the testimony was uncontradicted, that. the 
seventy-eight lots were sold separately. The only irregularit;r 
in the proceedings was the issuance of a single certificate of 
sale insteaq' .of separate certificates for each parcel. Sectio:n 
35, of the ordinance provides: "The . . . Board is hereby 
authorized to make any sale authorized by any agreement 
and bond and shall issue for each' sale an original and 4upl~ 
cate certificate of sale, in appropriate form, referring to this 
' .. ' .. : , .- . ".
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.ordinance, describing the parcels sold and containing the name 
of the purchaser; the originals shall be delivered to the pur· 
chaser and the duplicates. shall be· on file in the form . .of 
stub!! in a certificate book." 
While the ordinance required separate certificates of sale, 
it does not follow that the certificate issued was invalid. In 
Los Angeles Olive Growers' Assn. v. Pozz'i, 167 Cal. 454 [140, 
P. 581], this court stated:" ... the rule of strict adherence 
to statutory requirements in enforcing the payment of taxes 
anI! street assessments may sometimes be relaxed where it 
clearly appears from all the acts done under the proceedings 
that rio substantial right of the ,owner of the property charged 
with the payment of such taxes or assessments. has beenaf-
fected .... " In Stege v. City of Richmond, 194 Cal. 805 [228 
P. 461]; the court characterized as "irregular" group sales of 
lots sold for, delinquent special assessments under a statute 
requiring that the lots be sold separately. In the present casc 
the regularity .of the sales is unchallenged, and the complaint 
is directed solely at the form of the certificate of sale. That 
irregularity must be judged in the light of the statement in 
the Pozzi case, supra, and particularly the e:itpress mandate 
of the ordinance that the provisions thereof" shall be liberally 
construed to promote the .objects thereof, andno error, omis-
sion, .or irregularity iIi connection with the proceedings there-
under not affecting it substantial right of a party in interest 
shall invalidate any such proceedings." , 
The certificate refers to the ordinance and contains the name 
of the purchaser. It sets forth a description of each lot sold, 
and opp'osite each description appears the itemIzed unpaid 
portion of the bond executed thereon, the interest accrued on 
such bond, the advertising costs for the sale of such lot, and 
the total amouiitdue on each lot. While it does not state that 
these total amounts due represented the' sum for which each 
parcel was sold, the aggregate .of those totals equals the sum 
set forth as having been bid for the seventy-eight lots. More-
over, the sale authorized by each' bond was a sale for the 
amount due on that bond plus the expenses of sale. These 
facts support the contention that the single certificate of sale 
covering all the lots was the substantial equivalent of separate 
certificates of sale for each lpt. Plaintiff contends, however, 
that the issuance ofa single certificate imposed upon it an 
'unwarranted burden to redeem all the parcels sold, and that 
• 
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it was th~refore deprived of the right under the ordinance 
to redeem separately any of the parcels. It Claims that the 
certificate of sale and the sales were therefore void. 
The right of redemption is a substantial right of the owner 
(Oountyo/ San Diego ,v. Ohilds; 217 Cal. 109 [17 P.2d 734]; 
Los Angeles Olive Gr.owers' Assn.v. Pozzi,supra; Teralta 
Land etc. 00. v;.$hajJer,ll6 Cal. 518 [48 P. 613,58 }.,m.St.. 
Rep. 194]), ,and, the ord.iIlance in ques~ion \lndoubtedly con-
fets upon the oifner the right to redeem any or all of the 
parcels~ There is no impairment of that right by the issuance 
of '8, singlecertifiqate 9f sale. In fact plaintiff redeemed three 
of,the,se\,~nt1~eightparcels' before the commen?ement of ~his 
action,. Se,ction 31 provides : '~At any time before the explra-
t~oIi of oneyearfJ;"om the date of the certificate of sale, , any 
property sold u:p.der the provisions of, the preceding sections 
may be redeemed by any pers(,n having an intereiSt in" the 
property SQldby the pa'yInent to the Board of the amount for 
which the property w~ sold, with an additional penalty of 
15%oI the amount for .which the same was sold; all redemp7 
'tion . money, shall be pllid by the .Board to' the holder of' the 
proper original certificate of sale, upon delivering up the 
same and reqeipting for the amount received." Reference to 
the certificate of sale is made only in fixing the time for re~ 
demption: and, providing for the payment ol the redemption 
money to the holder oithe certificate. Redemption from.execu-
tion (Leet v; Atmbruster-,143 Cal. 663 [77 P. 653]; Phillips 
v.};Iagart, 1,1:i,c.~1. 562 [45 P. 843, 54 Am;St;Rep; 369] ; Her-
sheyv.L>ennis,,53Ca.l; .77; See Code Civ. Proc., §704)'and 
ta~~tes~org.i.na,:rily pr~)'yidedfoJ;" in this lUanner (Los An~ 
iieles,Olive, GfoUje,~~ , Asm.. v: rozzi, $upra; Oooper v. Shepard-
son, ,5.t,Cal:29$,;.l4stv. San<J,;ell, ,42 Clll.App.2d505 [10~P.2q 
37.6h Lais.tv. Nichols, 139 Gal.App. 202 [33 P;2d 8661; see 
Le'et yi ..4.rinbruSter, supra; 24 Cal.Jur. 342). it is also the 
g~~~rai rW;~;th~~ ,a p~oper tender is equivalent ,to payment 
,~d,,¢ff~c~: ~.; l'eq.eJJlptioIl of the land. sold. (Leet v. Arrn~ 
: bf",st.~rt~uprafO/G:ra4yv. Barnhisel, 23 Cal. 287; see 24 Cal. 
,JJij:." ~S,~,)3:4:.;, c~!. Q9de,§:1504.) Accordingly ,b.ad plaip.tiff 
wiShe,gtQ,redeei,ri, :he coulg have done so by niakinga'payment 
Or by ~tel:u;le~rngQod ~liith. Had he done so, whateverintere&t 
t~e;~ert~fi~a,t~ ,b.older:had in the property would, pass to the 
·plailitiff.,,(Si.J:!}1i'ranc,isco.etc. L. qo. v. Banbury, ,106 CaL 129 
.v~.~,:r~,4~9] ;Oooper v. Shepardson, supra; Laist., v.Nichols, 
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supra.} If the certificate holder refused to deliver lip the 
certificate, the plaintiff would have the same remedies as if 
separate certificates had been issued for eacb. parcel and the 
hoider refused to relinquish them. The trial ,court found, how-
ever that "neither the whole nor any part or parcel of the '". -' . .- . , '", . ". 
property describi!d in the complaint was redeemed by plam.; 
tiff" and that plaintiff did not "offer to redeemariy part or 
parcel of the property ... at any time from the date of sale 
to the date of the complaint." , 
The only difficulty presented by the issuance of a single cer-
tificate is that the purchaser's right to receive the money paid 
on redemption is conditional upon delivering, up the certifi-
cateof sale. (§ 37.) If, however, the purchaser were un-
willing to relinquish the certificate ofsnle because it repre-
sented his rights in the parcels Dot redeemed, he would be 
entitled to have the first certificate cancelled and proper cer· 
tilicat('s issued' to . him under the same rule that entitles a 
purchaserata:tax sale to have a corrected deed where alHhe 
proceedings IE\ading to and including the, sale ,a.revalid. 
(See Webster v. Somer, 159 Cal. 459 [114 P. 5751; Fox ~. 
T{)wnserpd, 152 Cal. 51 [91 P. 1004, 100'71 ; Grim!Yn v. O'Con-
nell, 64 Cal. 522, 523 ; Roth v. Quinn, 20 Cal.2d 488 [127,P.2d 
ll;Smart v.Peek, 213 Cal. 452 [2 P.2d 380].) 
It- shoilld ·also be noted that the bonds provided that the 
sales authorized thereunder "shall be made in the manner 
and form' provided bylaw fOJ,· the sale of real property on 
execution;" arid that defects in thefonll arid content of a cer-
tificate of· sale do not' affect the validity-of, ail execution sale 
or, the pr9(i,eedings the;reafWr taken. (4nth01ty v. J a1issen, 183 
Cal. 329 [In P.53&].) It isc6ntended,howeve:r, that the 
contra~y~l"Uie appliclibletp defects in ~1ic certifllla.te of a tax 
sale (lfind~ v. Clark, 173 Cal. 49 [159P: 153] ;prestonv. 
Hirsch, 5Cal.App.485 [90 P.965]; ct.O'Gradyv,Barnhisel, 
supra) is controlling, since assessments for street improve-
ments are in invitum and, in effect, tax proc~edings., Walton v. 
Moore, 98 ate. 237 [cll3P. 58, 114P. 105], is, cited for the 
proposition that there should, be' stricter compliance with the 
statute hi the case of a tax sale.where~ the liability is invol. 
nntar"Y' than ,in the case of a sale, on execution which usually 
results from the voluntary contract or act of the debtor: In 
the, prEl!!lent case, however, thebondsuXlder which the sales 
were held represent the voluntary contracts of the debtor . 
Ii 
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F'urth~rl~lO:re~,.it ,has' been 'held, that defects inccrti:fi.cates of 
tax salCl> tnay be. cllted by ret~oactivc legislation. (Stantonv.' 
Hotcl"Jr,is$,1r:,X:Cal.,6G~ [108P; 864J ; Fox v. Townsend, s'Upr~; 
Ba1~1c of,Lempqr;,lJ"v.;[ilulgham; 151 Cal. 234 [90 P. 936]; Baird 
v.,lI(anroe,,;lQO, Cal., 560 [89 P. 3521; Carter v. Osborn; 150 
'?al.,6~0 J89,~. ,§08].).Thecurative provisions in the ordinance 
)tsel,f,~~rv~tha.tpurpose., ' ' 
_."Fo): theforegom,.g 'reasons Ithink the judgment should ,be 
affirmed." , , . , 
"Edmonda, J., c~~c1ll1-'ed. 
[So F. No. 16732. In Bank. Nov. 2, 1942.] 
C. A. ROY,,' Respondent, v. RAYMOND SALISBURY as 
Executor, etc., Appellant.' ' 
[l]Contracts-Evid~nce~Exi~tence of Contracts.-In an action 
on. a probate claun, the eVIdence supported a finding as to the 
eXls~ence ofa contract for the care of a dog where a witness 
testl~ed to the decede~t'~ex~r.ession of desire that the dog'be 
kept m,the event of hlS'lnabihty to do so, the kennel keeper's 
agreement thereto, and the owner's subsequent reaffirmance of 
the agr~ement, ap.d where there was corrobative evidence, in-
cludini, evidence of payment made for care of the dog. 
[2] Id.-Evidenc~PerforJlll!.nce.-In an action on a probate claim 
for care. Qf a dog, the eviden~eestablishes the delivery of the 
dogund~r the terms C!f Ij.contract to care for it in the event the 
owner was una~le~o do so, where it appears that, when the 
o~ner was hosp'ltahzed a close friend ordered the dog to the 
kennels ~nd' the owner on returning from the hospital shortly 
before' hIS death spoke of the dog but did not ask that it, be 
: t returned. 
:[8] Id~ 7 Subject Matter - Care of Dog . ....;.An oral contract for 
'. the care of ,a dog was properly construed to apply in case ~f 
, ~he own,er's,death Or, his inability to care for it because of his 
illness where: there wastestir110ny that the owner at the time 
.McK.Dig.,ltetere~ces: [1, 2] Contracts, §281;[3, 6] Contracts, 
§163a; [4]:Fraud,s,Statllte of,§ 4; [5] Frauds, Statute of, § 49; 
J7] Contracts,§,U2; [8] Contracts, §§ 150, 152; [9] Decedents' 
Estates, § 578 ;-[10] Appeal and Eh'or, §1569. 
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was referring to his ,ill health and that he had both contingen-
,cies in ,inind. (See Civ. Code,§ 1649.) 
,[4] Frauds, etatute of~Agreements Not ;Performed in Lifetime.~ 
, -An oral contract for the <lare" of a dog is not invali4 under 
Code Civ. Proc., § l!i73,subd. 6, andOiv. Code, § 1624,' subd. 6, 
where as one alternative it conteinplates care during the own-
er's ill health and thus admits of performance during his life-
time .. 
[Q~ Id.-Operation~Contract Partly Within Statute,.-Where one 
part ofa contract is capable of performance within the own-
er's lifetime an!'! is thus not within the statute of frauds, and 
where such performance may constitute also a performance' of 
the other part of the contract which is within the statute, the 
contract may not be coridemlled. Further, where a· contract 
contains alternative promises, as where it' relates to payment 
for care of a: dog if the owner dies or if he becomes incapaci-
tated, and where one of the promises is within the statute and 
'the other is not, recovery may be had for the breach of the latter. 
[Ga, Gb]Contracts-SubjectMatter-Care of Dog.-A contract for 
the care of a dog if the owner "should become unable to care" 
for it was properly construed as referring to his illness in 
view of the owner's discussion of his ill health in connection 
with the transaction, and it was not, therefore, fatally uncer-
tain. 
[7] Id;-Certainty.-Courts lean against destruction of contracts 
because of uncertainty, and, if ,feasable, construe them so as 
to carry out, the reasonable intentions of the parties if that 
can be ascertained. 
[81 Id.-Interpretation-By Parties.-The practical construction 
of a contract made by the parties is cogent evidence of their 
intent. Hence, any uncertainty as too. provision foreare of 
a dog while the owner is "unable" to care for it is removed 
where the dog is delivered pursuant to the contract during the 
owner's illness. 
[9] Decedents' Estates-Claims-Testimony of Parties or Assign-
ors-Assignment.-An instrument executed by a married 
woman subsequent to the execution of a contract and the death 
of the promisor and reciting an agreement that the claim 
against the estate of the promisor is the separate property of 
her husband, is not an assignment within Code Civ. Proc., 
§ 1880, subd. 3, but a recognition of an established status of 
[4] See 12 Ca1.Jur. 857. 
[5]. See 25 It.C.L. 703. 
